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REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPEACHMENT OF SHERIFF
RETURNS AS GOOD EXCUSE WHEN SETTING
ASIDE DOMESTIC DEFAULT JUDGMENTS
JOSEPH H. VIVES
The impeachment of sheriff returns in Texas has enjoyed a uniformity of
judicial determination rarely experienced by other segments of the state's
jurisprudence. This stability is attributed to the establishment of precise requirements, strictly enforced by the courts. The primary purpose of this arrangement is to place significant official functions of tribunals beyond the
reach of meritless attack. A major objective of the courts has been to maintain lay discipline and respect for lawful judicial orders. Allowing the public to become insensitive to these solemn acts would render our judicial system chaotic. *
In order to establish a compelling obligation to appear upon service of
process in civil cases, the courts have armed themselves with the formidable weapon of default judgment. Such a forfeiture serves two purposes.
It penalizes a litigant who does not appear by granting relief to the party
who was conscientious in appearing for trial, and prevents useless consummation of time. The burden of granting endless continuances and
hearings for unmeritorious failures to appear for trial would seriously hinder
the effectiveness of the courts by overcrowding their dockets.
Despite this disciplinary mechanism and concern for the efficient operation of the courts, a sense of fairness has been primordial throughout the
administration of the law in Texas. Courts are not deaf to legitimate grievances challenging a default judgment and have afforded adequate redress to the blameless casualties of its system of default. Consequently, an
improper default judgment can be vacated if the complainant shows "good
cause" why the verdict should be set aside and a reassessment of the merits
entertained. The impeachment of a sheriff's return has often provided the
impetus for such a remedy. This comment will consider the position occupied
by the impeachment of sheriff returns within the good cause doctrine in
setting aside personal default judgments,' the stringent requirements to suc1. The text will deal solely with impeachment of regular service by private
citizens. Impeachment of service upon amended returns, foreign judgments, domestic
or foreign corporations, or returns containing insignificant defects will not be dealt
with. In all these areas of impeachment of officers' returns, the burden of rebutting
the return is still the same as to personal judgments with the exception of some
prior steps which must be taken. For example, in reference to amended returns, it is
provided that any mistake or informality in a return may be corrected by the officer
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cessfully challenge the integrity of the return, and recent developments de-

manding a reappraisal of this long-sanctioned and effective system.
IMPEACHMENT OF THE RETURN: ITS RELATIONSHIP TO GOOD
CAUSE FOR VACATING DEFAULT JUDGMENTS

A brief analysis of good cause and its underlying principles is appropriate
in order to better understand the role played by impeachment of sheriff returns when setting aside default judgments. Good cause is a broad require-

ment only partially fulfilled by successful impeachment.

Rebutting the re-

citals of the return which indicate that service of citation was in fact accomplished is not an omnipotent and independent act, invulnerable to other conditions or obligations.
Although the procedure for vacation of default judgments has been provided in rules promulgated by the Texas Supreme Court, 2 the establishment of the good cause requirements has been developed by a case by case
approach. Good cause must be shown when employing the two methods
most often used in setting aside judgments-motion for new trial and bill of
review.8 Through the long and irregular judicial development of good cause,
at any time under the direction of the court. TEX. R. Civ. P. 118. The right of
amending returns is unlimited in time and the amended return, when made, relates
back to the date when citation was filed. Lafleaur v. Switzer, 109 S.W.2d 239, 241
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1937, no writ); Employer's Reinsurance Corp. v. Brock,
74 S.W.2d 435, 438 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1934, writ dism'd). Consequently,
once a return has been corrected by amendment, the burden of impeachment is as
onerous as if the return had originally been proper.
Impeachment of sheriff returns in foreign judgments receives similar treatment as
in domestic judgments. The Texas Supreme Court has provided that evidence may
be received showing that the defendant was not served in a foreign judgment, notwithstanding the fact that the record says he was served or appeared. Norwood v.
Cobb, 24 Tex. 551, 555 (1859). See also, Reed v. State, 148 Tex. Crim. 409, 187
S.W.2d 660 (1944); In re Keen's Estate, 77 S.W.2d 588 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1934, no writ). For service on foreign and domestic corporations, see TEX. REV.
Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 2029 (1964); TEx. Bus. CoRp. AcT. ANN. arts. 2.11, 8.10
(1956).
Cases treating defects not invalidating the sheriff's return are numerous. E.g., Pugh
v. Texas Co., 437 S.W.2d 55, 57 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969, no writ) (omission
of the word "sheriff" after the officer's signature); Johnson v. Cole, 138 S.W.2d 910,
912 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1940, writ ref'd) (failure to cross out a digit on a printed
form resulting with the year 19120); Schneider v. Reidel, 128 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1939, writ dism'd) (the return was made by a deputy other than the
officer who actually served the citation); Tankersley v. Martin-Reo Sales Co., 242
S.W. 328 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1922, no writ) (omission of the abbreviation
"Mrs."); Miller v. Davis, 180 S.W. 1140, 1141 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ft. Worth 1915, no
writ) (insertion of "July" instead of "June" in the sheriff's return).
2. TEX. R. Civ. P. 320, 329(a), 566.
3. Motion for new trial and bill of review are both direct attacks in the court
that rendered the default judgment. Two other methods for attacking default judgments are appeal and writ of error. See McEwen v. Harrison, 162 Tex. 125, 345
S.W.2d 706, 710-11 (1961) for an analysis of how these attacks relate to motion for
new trial and bill of review.
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two indispensable requirements have come to be recognized. They are
commonly known as good excuse and meritorious defense. 4 Guidelines for
vacating default judgments by a motion for new trial were established in
Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc.5 where it was declared:
A default judgment should be set aside and a new trial ordered in any
case in which the failure of the defendant to answer before judgment
was not intentional, or the result of conscious indifference on his part,
but was due to a mistake or an accident; provided the motion for a
new trial sets up a meritorious defense and is filed at a time when the
granting thereof will occasion no delay or otherwise work an injury
to the plaintiff. 6
Stated in other terms, a manifestation of events which prevented a person
from appearing for trial through no fault of his own is considered good excuse. 7 Meritorious defense is defined as a showing of facts which in law
would constitute a defense, provided they are supported by affidavits or evidence proving prima facie that such a meritorious defense exists.5 Similar
requirements for attacking a default judgment by bill of review have been
interpreted as more onerous than those for a motion for new trial.9
4. The building of the good excuse-meritorious defense "good cause" principle
can be observed chronologically in Wright v. Thomas, 6 Tex. 420, 424 (1851), where
the court saw "nothing in the case to excuse the plaintiff from the necessity of appearing ......
Other noteworthy cases are Cochrane v. Middleton, 13 Tex. 275,
277 (1855) where a meritorious defense was in effect established by not "letting in
inequitable defenses" and Foster v. Martin, 20 Tex. 119, 123 (1857) where the court,
for the first time, joined both requirements in one opinion and using Wright and
Cochrane as authority, concluded that the defendant's case "states no sufficient excuse
for his failure to make his defense . . . nor does it disclose merits." In Dowell v.
Winters, 20 Tex. 794, 797 (1858) it was urged that such principles (good excuse and
meritorious defense) be followed for the sake of uniformity. Although some courts
disregarded the Dowell plea, the matter was finally settled in Smith v. Ferrell, 44
S.W.2d 962, 963 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932, holding approved) on a bill of review
and Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 134 Tex. 388, 393, 133 S.W.2d 124, 126
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1939, opinion adopted) on a motion for new trial.
5. 134 Tex. 388, 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1939, opinion adopted).
6. Id. at 393, 133 S.W.2d at 126; accord, Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212, 213
(Tex. Sup. 1966); Republic Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Dixon, 469 S.W.2d 646, 648
(Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971, no writ); Grammar v. Hobby, 276 S.W.2d 311, 312
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Meading v. Meading, 155
S.W.2d 991, 993 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1941, no writ); Yellow Transit Co. v.
Klaff, 145 S.W.2d 264, 266 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1940, no writ).
7. A demonstration of events which would justify failure to appear to most reasonable men seems to be the test and each case depends on its own particular facts.
See, e.g., Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 134 Tex. 388, 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1939, opinion adopted) where, due to a recent storm, the employees
of the insurer were so overworked that it was reasonable to assume that the citation
had been accidentally misplaced by one of the employees; Houston & T.C. Ry. v.
Burke, 55 Tex. 323 (1881) where the agent of the railway company mistakenly forwarded the citation to the wrong location; Dowell v. Winters, 20 Tex. 794 (1858)
where the lawyer had a mistaken understanding of the law with respect to filing an
answer.
8. Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex. Sup. 1966).
9. Id. at 214; Woods v. Gamboa, 229 S.W.2d 1021, 1023-24 (Tex. Civ. App.-
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The requirements of good excuse and meritorious defense must be shown
simultaneously when moving to set aside a default judgment; 10 one alone will
not suffice to vacate the judgment." For example, if a good excuse is not
shown, a default judgment will not be nullified regardless of the merit in
any alleged defense. 1 2 The impotence of a meritorious defense standing
alone stresses the significance of having a good excuse available.
Failure to appear due to lack of service, one of the many factors which
Dallas 1950, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dorsey v. Cutbirth, 178 S.W.2d 749, 750 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1944, writ ref'd w.o.m.). On a motion for new trial, the movant
need only "set up" a meritorious defense, whereas in a bill of review the court tries
good excuse and the merits in one "full blown trial." Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212,
214 (Tex. Sup. 1966). Analyzing or contrasting the requirements for good excuse
between a motion for new trial and bill of review, however, is unnecessary since the
quantum of proof for good excuse when alleging lack of service, seems to be the same
for both motion for new trial and bill of review. Although the landmark decision on
impeachment of sheriff returns in Texas, Randall v. Collins, 58 Tex. 231, 232 (1881),
which was a bill of review, drew a distinction between cases requiring "clear and
satisfactory" evidence and those which require only a preponderance of the evidence,"
the courts of Texas have clearly adopted the "clear and satisfactory" test for both
motion for new trial and bill of review when impeaching a sheriff's return. See
Wood v. City of Galveston, 76 Tex. 126, 130, 13 S.W. 227, 228 (1890); Gatlin v.
Dibrell, 74 Tex. 36, 38, 11 S.W. 908, 909 (1889); See Leibowitz v. San Juan State Bank,
409 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1966, no writ); Sanders v.
Harder, 223 S.W.2d 61, 62 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1949), rev'd on other
grounds, 148 Tex. 593, 227 S.W.2d 206 (1950); Johnson v. Cole, 138 S.W.2d 910,
912 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1940, writ ref'd); Panhandle Const. Co. v. Casey, 66
S.W.2d 705, 706 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1933, writ ref'd); San Antonio Paper
Co. v. Morgan, 53 S.W.2d 651, 653 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1932, writ dism'd);
Harrison v. Sharpe, 210 S.W. 731 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1919, writ ref'd);
Godshalk v. Martin, 200 S.W. 535, 536 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1918, no writ);
Swearingen v. Swearingen, 193 S.W. 442 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1917, writ
ref'd); Pierce-Fordyce Oil Assoc. v. Staley, 190 S.W. 814 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1917, no writ); Kempner v. Jordan, 26 S.W. 870 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894, writ ref'd).
See also Muniz v. Rosales, 483 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1972,
no writ).
The impeachment of a sheriff's return fulfills the good excuse requirement both in
a motion for new trial and a bill of review. In Gatlin v. Dibrell, 74 Tex. 36, 11
S.W. 908 (1889), an appeal from a refusal to grant a new trial, the defendant had to
impeach the return and show a meritorious defense. Another appeal stemming from
a motion for new trial indicates that impeachment satisfied the good excuse requirement under the Craddock rule. Leibowitz v. San Juan State Bank, 409 S.W.2d 586
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1966, no writ). Sanders v. Harder, 148 Tex. 593,
227 S.W.2d 206 (1950) clearly demonstrated that impeachment of a sheriff's return
amounts to good excuse in a bill of review, however, meritorious defense must still be
shown to overturn the default judgment.
10. Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 134 Tex. 388, 393, 133 S.W.2d 124,
126 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1939, opinion adopted); Smith v. Ferrell, 44 S.W.2d 962,
963 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932, holding approved).
11. Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex. Sup. 1966); Sanders v. Harder, 144
Tex. 593, 599, 227 S.W.2d 206, 210 (1950).
12. See, e.g., San Antonio Paper Co. v. Morgan, 53 S.W.2d 651, 653 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1932, no writ).
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qualify as good excuse for not appearing,' s is often alleged. 14 Although
want of service can be used effectively in satisfying the good excuse requirement, it must be categorized separately from other grounds of good excuse since it is fundamentally dissimilar from other defenses for not appearing. One significant difference arises in situations where lack of service
will successfully overturn default judgments without the support of a meritorious defense. This occurs when the lack of service appears on the face
of the judgment record. Under these circumstances, want of process alone
is sufficient to nullify the judgment.' 5 A different situation exists, however, if the recitals in the record indicate proper service. When this occurs,
demonstrating a want of service will not be sufficient to vacate a judgment
in the absence of a meritorious defense. 16 This raises another essential dissimilarity between lack of service and other variations of good excuse. If
the judgment recites proper service, the party moving to vacate the judgment must successfully impeach the sheriff's return in order to legitimately
argue want of service as good excuse. 17 This added burden is not imposed
upon other excuses for not appearing. For example, a showing of mistake
or accident, other than lack of service, will frequently be accepted because
the court is in no position to effectively contest the veracity of the excuse.' 8
13. E.g., Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 134 Tex. 388, 133 S.W.2d 124
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1939, opinion adopted) (citation misplaced by the insurer's
employees); Republic Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Dixon, 469 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1971, no writ) (oversight of counsel's secretary); Maeding v. Maeding,
155 S.W.2d 991 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1941, no writ) (unavoidable absence of
attorney); Yellow Transit Co. v. Klaff, 145 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1940, no writ) (loss in the mails of a motion for a continuance).
14. See, e.g., Ward v. Nava, 488 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. Sup. 1972); Pugh v. Texas
Co., 437 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969, no writ); Leibowitz v. San Juan
State Bank, 409 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1966, no writ).
15. August Kern Barber Supply Co. v. Freeze, 96 Tex. 513, 517, 74 S.W. 303,
304 (1903).
16. The rule is that once a default judgment has been rendered that is proper on
its face, alleging violation of the fundamental right of due process is not sufficient
to set the judgment aside. It has been said that a judgment rendered upon defective
or illegal service of process is no exception to the general rule requiring a meritorious
defense. Sharp v. Schmidt & Ziegler, 62 Tex. 263, 265 (1884). See also Sanders v.
Harder, 148 Tex. 593, 599, 227 S.W.2d 206, 210 (1950). This additional burden,
in contrast to void judgments showing invalid service in the record, is due to the principle that "[c]ourts ought not in such cases set aside [default] judgments rendered except upon a showing which if true and unexplained would change the result on a
subsequent trial." Holliday v. Holliday, 72 Tex. 581, 585, 10 S.W. 690, 692 (1889).
17. E.g., Leibowitz v. San Juan State Bank, 409 S.W.2d 586, 591 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1966, no writ).
18. See Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex. Sup. 1966); Craddock v.
Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 134 Tex. 388, 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1939,
opinion adopted) and the cases cited therein. The facts in these cases show that even
a "slight excuse" will suffice. Doweli v. Winters, 20 Tex. 794, 797 (1858). In contrast, a proper sheriff's return confirms that the arm of the court, through service of
process, has reached out and obtained jurisdiction of the party. Such a return requires
"clear and convincing" evidence for rebuttal. Martin v. Ventura, 493 S.W.2d 336,
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Where valid service has been accomplished, the position the court assumes
in relation to the defendant's contentions is considerably different. The party
seeking relief has to overcome the sheriff's declaration that he was properly
served. The return of the sheriff is clothed with absolute verity in such cir20
cumstances' 9 and a rebuttable presumption favors its recitals.
REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPEACHMENT

The origin and early development of the requisites for successful impeachment of sheriff returns in Texas was sudden and uncomplicated.
Although early cases presented the opportunity, 2 1 the courts failed to define specific requirements for the impeachment of officers' returns. For example, even though the 1859 decision of Norwood v. Cobb 22 dealt with the
impeachment of service on a foreign judgment, the court could have established guidelines since the methods of challenging the jurisdiction of both
foreign and domestic courts are identical. 23 Overlooking this opportunity,
the court simply held:
[I]n order to show the want of jurisdiction of the court rendering the
judgment, evidence may be received, to prove that no process was

served upon the defendant, and that he did not appear in person, or
by attorney, notwithstanding
it is stated in the record, that the defend24
ant appeared.
The court in Norwood recognized that impeachment of service could be effected, but failed to provide measures for its accomplishment.
The area of impeachment of sheriff returns was not significantly recognized until 1881 when the Supreme Court of Texas rendered the landmark
decision of Randall v. Collins.2 5 The decision established the nature and quality of evidence required to effectively overturn an officer's return.
[I]f equity will allow one who has been guilty of no fault or negligence
to contradict the sheriff's return by parol evidence for the purpose of having an unjust judgment by default set aside, we are of opinion that it
should require the evidence to be clear and satisfactory. It is not like
339 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, no writ); Leibowitz v. San Juan State Bank, 409
S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1966, no writ).
19. Gatlin v. Dibrell, 74 Tex. 36, 37, 11 S.W. 908, 909 (1889).
20. Muniz v. Rosales, 483 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1972,

no writ); McDonald v. Brown, 36 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1931,
writ dism'd).
21. See, e.g., Roberts v. Stockslager, 4 Tex. 307 (1849), vacating default judgment
because of defective service; Merrit v. Clow, 2 Tex. 582, 589 (1847), setting aside a
judgment agreed to by an attorney not authorized or without the knowledge of a defendant who was not served with process.
22. 24Tex. 551 (1859).
23. Mendlovitz v. Samuels Shoe Co., 5 S.W.2d 559, 560 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1928, no writ).
24. Norwood v. Cobb, 24 Tex. 551, 555 (1859) (emphasis added).
25. 58 Tex.231, 232 (1881).
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an ordinary26 issue of fact, to be determined by a mere preponderance of
testimony.
Compelled to more clearly define the specificity of requirements, the court
in Randall quoted from a Tennessee chancery decision:
Nor will one witness alone suffice to successfully impeach the return, for
that would be oath against oath. In analogy to the denials or averments of a sworn answer upon the defendant's knowledge, there should
be two witnesses, or one witness with strong corroborating circumstances. And without reference to this rule, upon general principles,
it would seem essential to the peace and quiet of society that these
solemn official acts 27should not be set aside with the same ease as an
ordinary act in pais.
Eight years later, the Texas Supreme Court clearly demonstrated that it
intended to make Randall the standard for the impeachment of sheriff returns on motions for new trial in Texas. In Gatlin v. Dibrel2 8 a defaulting
party attempted to overturn a valid officer's return through the uncorroborated testimony of a co-defendant. In a brief opinion denying impeachment, the court re-emphasized the Randall decision by holding that the
parol evidence should be "clear and satisfactory" and that the evidence
should come from "two witnesses, or one witness with strong corroborating
''29
circumstances.
The strict requirements established in Randall and followed in Gatlin have
been conscientiously and vigorously enforced.3 0 Many forfeiting parties
have challenged them, but very few have succeeded. 3 l Although the standards for impeachment of a sheriff's return were clearly denominated, considerable litigation has nevertheless resulted. The central difficulty encountered in application of the requisites for impeachment has arisen in relation
to the corroboration required by one witness, while the alternate requirement of two witnesses has been relatively unchallenged.
26. Id. at 232-33 (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 491 (emphasis added), quoting Driver v. Cobb, 1 Tenn. Ch.490 (1873).
28. 74 Tex. 36, 11 S.W. 908 (1889).
29. Id. at 38, 11 S.W. at 909.
30. See, e.g., Wood v. City of Galveston, 76 Tex. 126, 13 S.W. 227 (1890);
Cortimiglia v. Miller, 236 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1959, no writ);
Sgitcovich v. Oldfield, 220 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1949, writ ref'd);
Johnson v. Cole, 138 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1940, writ ref'd); Crawford
v. Gibson, 203 S.W. 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1918, writ ref'd); Swearingen v.
Swearingen, 193 S.W. 442 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1917, writ ref'd); PierceFordyce Assoc. v. Staley, 190 S.W. 814 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1917, no writ).
31. Sanders v. Harder, 148 Tex. 593, 227 S.W.2d 206 (1950); Muniz v. Rosales,
483 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1972, no writ); Leibowitz v. San
Juan State Bank, 409 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1966, no writ);
Wright v. Austin, 175 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ft. Worth 1943, writ ref'd
w.o.m.); Panhandle Const. Co. v. Casey, 66 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1933, writ ref'd); West v. Dugger, 278 S.W. 241 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1925, writ
dism'd); Harrison v. Sharpe, 210 S.W. 731 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1919, writ
ref'd); Kempner v. Jordan, 26 S.W. 870 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894, writ ref'd).
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Impeachment by Two or More Witnesses
The two-witness requirement has not been challenged significantly in the
appellate courts.3 2 This is probably due to the fact that testimony by
two or more credible witnesses, providing clear and satisfactory evidence
of lack of service, usually settles the matter promptly in favor of the party
seeking to vacate the judgment if a meritorious defense is also alleged. The
paucity of two-witness litigation in the higher courts clearly demonstrates
that a plaintiff, divested of a favorable default judgment, is not willing to incur the expense and hardship of appeal against the apparent acceptability of
two-witness testimony. Several reported cases, however, have involved multiple witnesses supplying corroborating evidence. 33 Although they have
been classified as coming under the requirement calling for strong corroborating circumstances, they do contain facts and dictum which may shed
some light on what the two-witness requirement actually entails.
Before discussing these cases, however, the vague opinion of Kempner v.
Jordan34 merits attention in illustrating that the aftermath of Randall and Gatlin was not necessarily uniform. Although the court in Kempner deals with
the two-witness principle, the decision is of little benefit in establishing its
definition. The court held that the testimony of a husband and wife, codefendants in a foreclosure case, was sufficient to overturn a sheriff's return
showing proper service.3 5 Since the case presents few strong corroborating
circumstances,3 6 it is reasonable to assume that the court was approaching
the appeal using the two-witness requirement. In discussing the requirements for impeachment the court stated:
It is contended that the evidence was not of that clear and satisfactory
nature that would make it sufficient to support the finding of the court
below, impeaching the return of the sheriff. As positive and directly to the issue, it was clear and satisfactory as it could be, but it was
conflicting. [The sheriff] testified positively one way, and Jordan
and his wife positively the other. .

.

. The rule is that there must be

something more than an oath against an oath; that the testimony of the
officer must be met by the oath of two witnesses, or of at least one, with
32. One exception is Kempner v. Jordan, 26 S.W. 870 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894, writ
ref'd) which relied heavily on the testimony of the two co-defendants.
33. E.g., Muniz v. Rosales, 483 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1972,

no writ); McBride v. Kaulbach, 207 S.W. 576 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1918, writ
ref'd).
34. 26 S.W. 870 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894, writ ref'd).
35. Id. at 871. The court cited "a conflict of authority as to whether or not the

return of the sheriff, showing service on a party who is apparently bound by a judgment,
may be impeached by such party."

Buttressed by such conflict, the court allowed the

two co-defendants allegedly served to impeach the sheriff's return through their own

testimony.
36. The court merely found that the property had been the defendants' homestead

for 20 years and that the wife had never signed the deed of trust resulting in the
foreclosure sale. Id. at 871.
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strong corroborating circumstances. We see no reason8 7to reverse the
finding of the trial judge resolving the conflict of evidence.
Under the Kempner rationale, where the testimony of any two witnesses contradicts the sheriff's return, the trial court is entitled to resolve the conflict
of evidence. It seems unlikely, however, that the supreme court in Randall intended the two-witness test to be met by the two people who were
supposed to be served. The rejection of an oath against oath should still
apply regardless of the number of co-defendants, particularly where the
defendants are married and the possibility of collusion is likely.
It is possible that the Kempner opinion did not supply enough facts and
was actually based upon the one-witness corroborating circumstances rule.
Kempner, however, would still be questionable in light of a statement made
by a later court in McBride v. Kaulbach,3 that "neither will uncertain and
unsatisfactory circumstances raising a doubt or suspicion be sufficient to
corroborate a witness who contradicts the officer's return."8 9 McBride
treated multiple witnesses as corroborating evidence to the one-witness rule.
Three adult children sought to corroborate their aged father's denial of service following the rendering of a default judgment against him. They testified that they had a general knowledge of their father's business and read
papers for him at times. Although they admitted that at various times
they were not with him, they claimed they had no recollection or knowledge
of service on their father. 40 The court in McBride found this insufficient
for impeachment purposes and stated that:
[I]n order for negative testimony of this character to be given any probative force, it is necessary, in connection therewith, to offer positive
facts showing that had the service been made the witnesses would
necessarily have known it, and in our judgment it is not sufficient that
they might have known of it, or that they would probably have known
it.41
Another court was recently faced with a similar situation of multiple witnesses and as in McBride, treated the other witnesses' testimony as corroborative.

In Muniz v. Rosales,42 the defaulting plaintiff's daughter, son, and

son-in-law testified that they were living with him at the time of the alleged
service. All three claimed they never saw anyone serve him nor did they
ever notice any "papers" in the house. To the contrary, the officer's return
showed proper and valid service in 1959. The record further showed that
the defaulting party did not move to set aside the judgment until 1967. A
series of appeals and remands followed and the issue of the validity of serv37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 872.
207 S.W. 576 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1918, writ ref'd).
Id. at 579 (emphasis added).
Id. at 577.
Id. at 579 (emphasis added).

42. 483 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1972, no writ).
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ice was not put to rest until 12 years after the alleged date of service. In
holding for the defaulting party, Justice Cadena admits that "[u]nfortunately, 'it is hard to determine and enunciate just what quantum of proof' is
required."' 43 Under the particular facts of the Muniz case, however, more
weight should be given to the warning in McBride against circumstances raising "doubt and suspicion," particularly where close family members are corroborating events which occurred 12 years earlier. Nevertheless, the court
concluded that "[t]he testimony of plaintiff's daughter, son, and son-in-law
constitute strong enough corroborating evidence of plaintiff's testimony con'44
cerning lack of service."
The critical difference between McBride and Muniz is the status of the
witnesses in relation to the defendant at the time that service allegedly occurred. Unlike in McBride, the witnesses in Muniz permanently resided
with the individual contesting the return. These two cases, however, are
valuable in another respect. They provide considerable guidance as to
what position witnesses should assume to qualify under the two-witness
test. The witnesses in McBride were not living with the defendant and their
testimony was logically regarded as only corroborating evidence. The test
was even more narrowly applied in Muniz where the witnesses lived permanently with the defendant and the daughter stated that she rarely left his
side. 45 In spite of these changed circumstances, the Muniz opinion still
deemed the testimony as not falling within the two-witness category, but
merely corroborative.4
It is clear that to qualify under the two-witness test, in light of McBride
and Muniz, the witnesses must be present at the precise moment that service is alleged to have occurred. Living with the defendant or being in his
presence the great majority of the time is not alone sufficient. A hypothetical situation that would likely satisfy McBride and Muniz would be that of
two witnesses claiming, through clear and convincing evidence, that they
were with the defendant many miles away from the alleged point of service at the time service was alleged to have taken place.
One Witness with Strong CorroboratingCircumstances
The majority of litigation in appellate courts concerning impeachment
of sheriff returns has involved determination of what constitutes clear and
satisfactory evidence supporting the testimony of one witness who claims
he was not served. Even though each case depends largely on its own par43. Id. at 863; accord, Pierce-Fordyce Oil Assoc. v. Staley, 190 S.W. 814, 815
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1916, no writ).
44. Muniz v. Rosales, 483 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1972,
no writ).
45. Id. at 863.
46. Id. at 863.
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ticular facts, distinct principles have been developed regarding what constitutes strong and convincing corroborative evidence. Since the basic
standard was first enunciated in Randall and Gatlin, both cases where there
was one witness who attempted to establish strong corroborative evidence,
there have been many imaginative attempts to fulfill the requirement of corroborating circumstances sufficient to overturn the sheriff's return. A sworn affi48
davit by the defaulting party alone is insufficient, 4 7 as is loss of records,
or merely alleging that recitation of service was obtained by forgery. 49 A
number of other circumstances and arguments have likewise proved futile, 50
but examination of such cases would cast little light on the corroboration
question. For purposes of determining what constitutes corroboration, it
will be more helpful to analyze the cases where the evidence was held sufficient to overturn a valid sheriff's return.
Wondering, as other courts have, 51 what quantum of proof is required, the
court in Wright v. Austin 52 appropriately asked:
Certainly the words "strongly corroborated" mean a degree of corroboration exceeding what might be in ordinary terms called corroboration by any testimony of probative value. It is equally true that
the word "strong", which denotes strength, is susceptible to degrees of
comparison; language may be "strong", yet other expressions may be
stronger; and other language may be the strongest of all. Then, we
may ask how strong should the corroboration be to support an impeachment of the
53 officer's return. . . and to whom shall it be "clear and satisfactory"?
54
In seeking an answer, the court in Wright relied on Harrison v. Sharpe,
47. Wood v. City of Galveston, 76 Tex. 126, 130, 13 S.W. 227, 228 (1890).

48. East Texas Land & Improv. Co. v. Graham, 60 S.W. 472 (Tex. Civ. App.
1900, no writ).
49. Steves v. Smith, 107 S.W. 141, 146 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908, writ ref'd).
50. Pugh v. Texas Co., 437 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969, no writ);
Cortimiglia v. Miller, 326 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1959, no writ);
Sgitcovich v. Oldfield, 220 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1949, writ ref'd);

McCulloch v. Woodward, 220 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1949, no

writ); Johnson v. Cole, 138 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1940, writ ref'd);
San Antonio Paper Co. v. Morgan, 53 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1932,
no writ); Barkate v. Allen, 282 S.W. 670 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1926, no writ);
Joseph v. Kiber, 260 S.W. 269 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1924, no writ); Becker v.
Becker, 218 S.W. 542 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1920, no writ); McBride v.

Kaulbach, 207 S.W. 576 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1918, writ ref'd); Crawford v.
Gibson, 203 S.W. 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1918, writ refd); Godshalk
Martin, 200 S.W. 535 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1918, no writ; Swearingen

v.
v.

Swearingen, 193 S.W. 442 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1917, writ ref'd); PierceFordyce Oil Assoc. v. Staley, 190 S.W. 814 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1916, no
writ); Gallagher v. Teuscher & Co., 186 S.W. 409 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1916,

no writ).

51. E.g., Muniz v. Rosales, 483 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1972, no writ); Pierce-Fordyce Oil Assoc. v. Staley, 190 S.W. 814, 815 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1916, no writ).
52. 175 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ft. Worth 1943, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
53. Id. at 283-84.

54. 210 S.W. 731 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1919, writ ref'd).
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the first decision where the facts were held to meet the strong corroborating
evidence requirement. Harrison involved the judicial sale of the defaulting
plaintiff's land in order to pay $7.61 of taxes due on the property. Judgment was in 1910, but the plaintiff lived on the premises undisturbed until
1916 when she became aware of the judgment and sale. The return of the
sheriff was proper and valid on its face, but the court held that the corroborating evidence was strong enough to sustain impeachment, stating:
The fact that they paid all taxes for previous and subsequent years,
that they put valuable improvements on this property about the time
of or after the sale, the utter disproportion in the amount of the taxes
and the value of the property, with no reasonable expectation of finally
ridding the property of the menace of such proceedings, without the expenditure of sums of money so largely in excess of the small amounts
that would have been required to have been paid in the first stages of
the proceedings-all these facts tend, we think, to corroborate the testimony of the mother and son that they knew nothing of this suit until
it was discovered in the manner detailed by them. 55
In reaching its decision, the court in Harrisonmade several observations which
subsequent courts have relied on.5 6 The court's first determination was
that the corroborating evidence must come from sources other than the witness who requires the corroboration.5 7 In Harrison,this test was met by tax
records, valuable improvements, long and undisturbed occupancy after the
default judgment-all circumstances which the court could have determined in the absence of the plaintiff's testimony. The court further stated
that although corroborating evidence can be direct and positive, it can also
be circumstantial. 58 Relying on a criminal case, 59 the court in Harrison concluded:

Ifthe independent facts and circumstances, taken all together, are, "in
the opinion of both the court and the jury, strong that is, cogent, powerful, forcible, calculated to make a deep or effectual impression upon
the mind", then the direct testimony may be said to be "strongly corroborated."6 0
Several decisions since Harrison have held the corroborating circumstances sufficient to overturn a sheriff's return. With the exception of two
cases, however, the corroborating circumstances arose out of defects or ir55. Id. at 733.
56. Sanders v. Harder, 148 Tex. 593, 597, 227 S.W.2d 206, 209 (1950); Wright v.
Austin, 175 S.W.2d 281, 284 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ft. Worth 1943, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
57. Harrison v. Sharpe, 210 S.W. 731, 733 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1919, writ
ref'd). It is interesting to note that the court in Harrison relied on several criminal
cases in reaching its decision as to corroborating evidence. E.g., Gabrielsky v. State,
13 Tex. Ct. App.428, 440 (1883).
58. Harrison v.Sharpe, 210 S.W. 731, 733 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1919, writ
ref'd); accord, Wright v.State, 31 Tex. Crim. 354, 359, 20 S.W.756, 758 (1892).
59. Hernandez v. State, 18 Tex. Ct. App. 134, 150 (1885).
60. Harrison v. Sharpe, 210 S.W. 731, 733 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1919, writ
ref'd).
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Although the defects were not fatal, the in-

consistencies tended to support the defendants' assertions that they were not
served. For example, tampering with the mileage covered in serving the citation,02 irregular or confusing dating of the return, 63 and allowing service
by an unauthorized person6 4 have all been considered as strongly corroborative circumstances.

Consequently, since the returns were not proper,

the corroborative evidence offered by the witness was not as critical as in
other cases where the return was regular on its face.
A decision since Harrison which has treated the corroboration problem,

unjaundiced by return irregularities, is Sanders v. Harder.65 This decision
is of consequence because it is the only supreme court case where corroborative evidence was sufficient to overturn a proper sheriff's return. The
facts state that a tract of property had been a homestead for many years, but
the property was awarded to the respondent upon an execution sale resulting from a default judgment. The plaintiffs continued living on their homestead unaware of any judgment divesting them of their property. Their undisturbed occupancy continued for 7 years, until the respondent brought
an action of trespass to try title. In reversing the trial court's refusal to
set aside the default judgment, the supreme court found strong corroborating
circumstances to support the couple's impeachment of service. The court
said that ignoring a suit divesting the couple of their homestead would be
"most unnatural." 6 6 It was also found that the husband had made valuable improvements after the date of default.67 As in Harrison, the court
found corroborating circumstances in addition to the testimony of the defendants. 68

Although granting judgment for the defendants, the court re-

marked:
Were the denials of service by petitioners the only evidence before the
court, then no issue should have been submitted to the jury, for, as held
61. Wright v. Austin, 175 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ft. Worth 1943, writ
ref'd w.o.m.); Panhandle Const. Co. v. Casey, 66 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1933, writ ref'd); West v. Dugger, 278 S.W. 241 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1925, writ dism'd).

62. Wright v. Austin, 175 S.W.2d 281, 285 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ft. Worth 1943,

writ ref'd w.o.m.).
63. Panhandle Const. Co. v. Casey, 66 S.W.2d 705, 707 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1933, writ ref'd).
64. West v. Dugger, 278 S.W. 241 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1925, writ dism'd).
65. 148 Tex. 593, 227 S.W.2d 206 (1950).
66. Id. at 598, 227 S.W.2d at 209.
67. Id. at 598, 227 S.W.2d at 209.
68. Id. at 597-98, 227 S.W.2d at 209. As stated in the opinion:
An examination of the record has convinced us that there are corroborating
circumstances in this case. Jim Sanders bought this property in 1925 and moved
upon it in 1926. He married Jessie Sanders in 1933, and the property has been
occupied by them as a homestead since that date. . . . After the default judgment
was rendered in 1941 their possession was not disturbed until a writ of scire facias
was served upon them in this case approximately seven years later.
id. at 597-98, 227 S.W.2d at 209.
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by the Court of Civil Appeals, the return of a sheriff on a citation may
not be impeached by the uncorroborated testimony of the party or parties
shown by the return to have been served.6 9
Having previously refused error for Harrison and again citing its sound reasoning, the supreme court in Sanders clearly supports the principle that the
corroborating evidence must be from other sources than from the witness who
requires corroboration. 70 The supreme court in Sanders strictly applied the
corroborating evidence standard used by other courts. It can thus be seen
that although each case depends largely on its own particular facts, the corroboration must be strong and substantial.
WARD v. NAVA

Circumvention of the Requirements
It is unfortunate that the law controlling the impeachment of sheriff returns which has been with us for many years has been confused by Ward v.
Nava.7 1 This recent case, decided by the Texas Supreme Court, raises some
serious questions.
Nava brought suit against Ward for injuries resulting from an auto-pedestrian accident and a default judgment was rendered against the defendant.
Ward filed a timely motion for new trial which included an affidavit attempting to set up a meritorious defense and alleged lack of service as good
excuse for not filing an answer. The trial court overruled Ward's motion for
new trial and on appeal the court of civil appeals affirmed the trial court's
judgment holding that the affidavit was factually insufficient to impeach the
sheriff's return because the defendant attempted to supply the necessary corroborating evidence through his own testimony. 72 The Texas Supreme
Court reversed the trial court and held that although the defendant had been
and a meritorious
duly served, he had nevertheless shown a good excuse
73
aside.
judgment
default
the
set
therefore,
and
defense
For purposes of analyzing the rationale of the Ward decision in reconciling valid service and excuse for not appearing, excuses under the good cause
doctrine may be considered as falling into two distinct categories. The first
class of cases contain alleged lack of service as good excuse for not appearing.7 4 In such instances, since a presumption of valid service runs in favor
of a proper sheriff's return, the defendant must come forth with clear and
satisfactory evidence impeaching the officer's return. 75 In the second type
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 597, 227 S.W.2d at 209.
Id. at 597, 227 S.W.2d at 209.
488 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. Sup. 1972).
Ward v. Nava, 483 S.W.2d 510 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972).
Ward v. Nava, 488 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tex. Sup. 1972).

74. See, e.g., Leibowitz v. San Juan State Bank, 409 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. Civ. App.-

Corpus Christi 1966, no writ).

75. Gatlin v. Dibrell, 74 Tex. 36, 38, 11 S.W. 908, 909 (1889); Leibowitz v.
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of good excuse cases, service of process is not contested, but an act or event
independent of service of process is presented as the reason for not being
present at trial. 76 It will be seen that the supreme court considered both
categories in reaching its decision in Ward.
Where the defendant in the first class of cases alleges lack of service, the
impeachment of the sheriff's return can be accomplished only through clear
and satisfactory evidence from at least two witnesses, or one witness with
strong corroborating circumstances. 77 Where only one witness offers evidence to impeach the return, the corroborating evidence must come from
8
sources other than the witness whose testimony requires the corroboration.3
79
Impeachment cannot be effected by the movant's testimony alone.
Despite these well-established principles, the only evidence offered by Ward to
support his contention that he was not served was contained in his affidavit
filed in connection with the motion for new trial. The instrument provided in part:
I further understand that the citation indicats [sic] that I was served
personally on or about October 21, 1971. This is not true. No sheriff
or constable has ever served any papers of any kind on me personally in this case. I first learned that there was a lawsuit when someone called me on Friday, November 19, 1971, and asked about the lawsuit. I do not remember the person's name who made this call. That
weekend I looked to see if there were any suit papers at my house and
on Sunday I found a petition. I do not known how this petition got in
my house. I asked my wife and she had never been served with it and
I am certain that I was not served with it. Most likely, it was left
in my mailbox and my kids brought the petition with the mail and
no one ever showed it to me.
I intended to take it to my insurance agent on November 22, but forgot and left it at home and finally took it to him on November 23,
1971.80

The court recognized that "the testimony of the moving party alone, without corroborating facts or circumstances, is not sufficient to overcome the
San Juan State Bank, 409 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1966, no
writ); San Antonio Paper Co. v. Morgan, 53 S.W.2d 651, 653 (Tex. Civ. App.-

Austin 1932, no writ).
76. Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 134 Tex. 388, 390, 133 S.W.2d 124,
125 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1939, opinion adopted); Texas Iron & Metal Co. v. Utility

Supply Co., 493 S.W.2d 545, 546 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1973, no writ);
Cadena v. Dicker, 383 S.W.2d 73, 74 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1964, no writ).

77. Gatlin v. Dibrell, 74 Tex. 36, 38, 11 S.W. 908, 909 (1889); Randall v.
Collins, 58 Tex. 231, 233 (1881).
78. Harrison v. Sharpe, 210 S.W. 731, 733 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1919, writ
ref'd).
79. Wright v. Austin, 175 S.W.2d 281, 283 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ft. Worth 1943,
writ ref'd w.o.m.); Johnson v. Cole, 138 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1940, writ ref'd).
80. Ward v. Nava, 488 S.W.2d 736, 739 (Tex. Sup. 1972) (affidavit restated in

dissenting opinion).
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presumption that the officer's return on the citation was correct." 8 ' Consequently, the court did not disturb the trial court's finding that the affidavit
alone did not establish lack of service8 2 and in this respect, they were clearly
correct. Although it was determined that the defendant did not qualify
under the first class of cases which requires impeachment of the sheriff's
return, the court proceeded to find that the facts alleged by Ward established
a good excuse as defined by the second category of cases where service of
process is acknowledged and other causes are alleged that constitute the
good excuse for not appearing.
In the cases where service is not contested, good excuse is determined
under the rule established in Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc.88

Un-

der such circumstances, the burden of proof is less onerous since the sheriff's return is not the subject of controversy. It is incumbent upon the defendant to show that his failure to appear was due to accident or mistake or
other circumstances beyond his control; that an event totally unrelated to
service of process has prevented him from appearing and the defendant
did not intend to avoid appearance nor was he guilty of conscious indifference.8 4 In applying this rule to Ward, the defendant had to show that
an event or accident occurred between the date of service and the date of default preventing his appearance. The majority of the court regarded the
personal service upon Ward as established. What then, was the reason set
up for his inaction following the service? The court in Ward looked to the
defendant's conduct subsequent to the telephone call informing him of the
litigation, since a showing of diligence upon discovery of a default judgment
is the most persuasive method for rebutting the suspicion of intentional disregard or conscious indifference when alleging a good faith excuse.8 5 Thus,
the weekend search for the citation, the fact that he would have appeared
had he been aware of service, and the delivery of the citation one day later
to his insurance agent, were all considered important acts of diligence by the
supreme court.8 6 The court gave considerable weight to Ward's allegation
87
that had he been aware of the citation, he would have filed an answer.
81. Id. at 738.
82. Id. at 738.
83. 134 Tex. 388, 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1939, opinion adopted).
84. Id. at 393, 133 S.W.2d at 126. In Craddock, for example, service of process
was admitted. The excuse for not appearing was the loss of citation in the insurer's
offices.
85. Diligence by a defaulting defendant is usually exemplified in moving quickly
to set aside the default judgment as soon as it is discovered. See, e.g., Craddock v.
Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 134 Tex. 388, 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1939,
opinion adopted).
86. Ward v. Nava, 488 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tex. Sup. 1972).
87. Id. at 738. In discussing the defendant's actions, the court noted:
As a result of the search, he found the papers. He was unaware of having seen
them prior to this time. He did not intend to ignore the citation nor neglect to
file an answer. If he had been aware that he had been served, he would have
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The supreme court, however, did not consider Ward's actions in relation to
the period of time immediately following service of process. Since Ward
was unsuccessful in impeaching the sheriff's return, valid service was an established fact. Consequently, the good intentions alleged in Ward's affidavit
could not have existed. A telephone call could have done no more than
remind Ward of the suit, rather than inform him about it for the first time
since that was already accomplished by the service of process. And why
should a weekend search be necessary for an important document had in
hand from the beginning? Ward's argument that he "did not intend to ignore the citation nor neglect to file an answer" is irreconcilable with the fact
of valid service. Ward, in the absence of an intervening excuse, could have
only intentionally ignored or neglected appearance. 8 Since no independent act or event transpired between the date of service and the default to
give him a good excuse, Ward's allegations were merely attempts to complement an excuse which had already been found to be without merit.
Although the good excuse requirement is more relaxed on motions for
new trial under the guidelines set out in Craddock, it is doubtful that the
commission of appeals intended that allegations which directly conflict with
valid service should suffice. The court in Ward has in effect allowed implied impeachment of a sheriff's return while at the same time stating that it
could not be done directly in light of the evidence. Yet the evidence for
both attacks came from the same source-Ward's uncorroborated affidavit.
Quantum of Proof
The ramifications of Ward are not limited to the indirect impeachment of
sheriff returns. The Ward opinion indicated that a more lenient quantum
of proof should be applied to motions for new trial instead of the "clear
and satisfactory" rule. The court stated that "[a]s in any other fact issue,
the burden was on Ward to establish his case by a preponderance of the
evidence," and concluded that the trial court presumably found that the
"affidavit did not establish lack of service by a preponderance of the evidence." 8 9 This language indicates a departure from the long-established
burden of clear and satisfactory evidence on motions for new trial. Although the supreme court's first pronouncement of clear and satisfactory
evidence for impeachment of sheriff returns was made in Randall v. Colturned the papers over to the insurance company, and it was only through inadvertence and mistake that they were not turned over to the insurance company
so that an answer could be filed.
Id. at 738 (emphasis added).
88. See San Antonio Paper Co. v. Morgan, 53 S.W.2d 651, 653 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1932, no writ) (concluded that since service of process was established, the
defendant was necessarily negligent).
89. Ward v. Nava, 488 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tex. Sup. 1972).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

17

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 5 [2022], No. 2, Art. 4

1973]

COMMENTS

lins,90 a bill of review, the same test was later adopted by the high court
on motions for new trial in Gatlin v. Dibrell.", In the aftermath of Gatlin, courts confronted with impeachment of officers' returns on motions for
new trial have consistently required that
the evidence be clear and satis92
factory, as directed by the supreme court.
The court in Ward cites only Sanders v. Harder93 as authority for application of the preponderance of the evidence test to the impeachment of a
sheriff's return. Unlike Ward, Sanders not only was a bill of review proceeding, but it was also a jury case in which the Texas Supreme Court was
attempting to show the relationship of a jury to the "clear-satisfactory" and
"preponderance of the evidence" rules. A careful reading of the Sanders
decision and the citations therein clearly shows that the court in Sanders intended to maintain the clear and satisfactory requirement on impeachment
of sheriff returns. 9 4 The court in Sanders pointed out that in cases where
issues must be resolved by clear and convincing evidence, the jury is only
charged regarding a preponderance of the evidence. 9 5 The clear and convincing rule is "but an admonition to the judge to exercise great caution in
weighing the evidence" to satisfy himself that the impeaching evidence is sufficient. 9 6 The court in Sanders was not suggesting that preponderance of
the evidence is the proper test as the court in Ward implies, but instead was
reaffirming the proposition that a charge incorporating the rules regarding clear and satisfactory evidence would be an intimation to the jury of
97
the weight to be given the testimony.
Even though it is possible that the supreme court in Ward did not intend
to change the quantum of proof required for the impeachment of sheriff
returns, the decision will nonetheless cause confusion in the lower courts.
Although its full impact cannot yet be ascertained, one court has dealt with
the impeachment of a sheriff's return since Ward. The court of civil appeals
in Martin v. Ventura98 in effect avoided a direct confrontation with the
problem created by Ward. Without noting that Ward discussed only the preponderance of the evidence rule, the court of civil appeals cited the supreme
court decision as authority for the proposition that proof on impeachment of
90. 58 Tex. 231, 232 (1881).
91. 74 Tex. 36, 11 S.W. 908, 909 (1889).
92. Leibowitz v. San Juan State Bank, 409 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1966, no writ); San Antonio Paper Co. v. Morgan, 53 S.W.2d 651, 653
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1932, no writ); Grayce Oil Co. v. Varner, 260 S.W. 883,
884 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1924, no writ).
93. 148 Tex. 593, 227 S.W.2d 206 (1950).
94. Id. at 598-99, 227 S.W.2d at 209-10.
95. id. at 598, 227 S.W.2d at 209.
96. Id. at 598, 227 S.W.2d at 209.
97. See also Carl v. Settegast, 237 S.W. 238 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1922, holding
approved).
98. 493 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, no writ).
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sheriff returns must be clear and satisfactory. 9 In order to reconcile the discrepancies in the case with the traditional clear and satisfactory requirement, the court in Martin interpreted Ward to require a defendant to establish his case by a preponderance of evidence 00 and to impeach the sheriff's
return with clear, satisfactory and convincing proof of lack of service. 101
This demonstrated a possible concern by the court in Martin for maintaining the long-standing quantum of proof in impeachment of returns. In effect,
the court of civil appeals suggested the result that Ward should have pronounced. The court, therefore, did not ignore a supreme court opinion directly on point and at the same time followed the previous standard of clear
and satisfactory proof.
CONCLUSION

In the past, the requirements for impeachment of sheriff returns have
been strictly enforced in all forms of attack upon default judgments, but
Ward may herald new leniency in motions for new trial. Ward has demonstrated that the requisites for impeachment of official returns may be
circumvented, making the official acts of the courts subordinate to the uncorroborated allegations of one witness. Allowing these statements to constitute good excuse after they are found insufficient to impeach a sheriff's
return may lessen the significance of service of process and the corresponding obligation to appear. Additionally, the Ward decision may cause confusion in determining what quantum of proof is required to successfully impeach a sheriff's return. Depending on the interpretation given to the Ward
opinion by other courts, a defaulting defendant may be able to impeach a
sheriff's return by a mere preponderance of evidence rather than by the
long-standing requisite of clear and satisfactory proof. The ramifications
of Ward upon the established rules of impeachment of returns may be significant. Ward risks disorganizing a long-proven and effective system by
endorsing circuitous tactics and confusing the quantum of proof required
to impeach sheriff's returns on a motion for new trial.
99. Id. at 339.
100. Id. at 338.
101. Id. at 339.
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